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At first sight, politics and melancholia can only appear as an odd 
couple. Whereas the realm of politics evokes enthusiastic activity and 
strategic interests, melancholia is generally associated with passive 
contemplation and a lack of worldly engagement. If politics connotes 
vital, future-oriented struggles over the divisions of the community, 
melancholia suggests individual incapacitation, even dissolution, by 
predatory hangovers from the past. Hence, if one were to identify a 
relation between both terms it would seem to be an inversely proportional 
one: an increase of politics would be concomitant with a decline of 
melancholia, and vice versa. 
Such an opposition is at once supported and complicated by the 
astonishingly extensive modern scholarship regarding the history of 
melancholia, which ranges across the fields of philosophy, literature, art 
and medicine. As Giorgio Agamben points out in an important study of 
the condition, the ancient analyses of the operations and implications of 
black bile – which find a locus classicus in the Aristotelian Problemata, 
whose author invokes hoi melancholikoi – come to be associated by the 
Middle Ages not only with philosophy, poetry and arts, but with a moral 
malady as well.1 
We subsequently discover periodic plagues of melancholia 
troubling the history of Western life, attested to by all sorts of evidence, 
not least that provided by the most outstanding creative types, Albrecht 
Dürer and William Shakespeare among them. As J. L. Koerner proposes 
of Dürer’s own famous image of Melencolia I, in the wake of such eminent 
commentators as Saxl and Panofsky, Warburg, and Walter Benjamin:
Melencolia seems designed to generate multiple and contradictory 
readings, to clue its viewers to an endless exegetical labour until, 
exhausted in the end, they discover their own portrait in Dürer’s 
sleepless, inactive personification of melancholy. Interpreting the 
engraving itself becomes a detour to self-reflection, just as all the 
arts and sciences whose tools clutter the print’s foreground finally 
return their practitioners to the state of a mind absorbed in itself.2
Multiple, contradictory, sleepless, inactive: when attempting to 
address melancholia, the oxymorons seem to concatenate inexorably, 
and, in this concatenation, further disseminate and compound the 
condition itself. Melancholia is as catching as it is caught; it is as if its 
1  See Agamben 1993, passim.
2  Koerner 1997, p. 23. As Koerner continues: ‘the account [by Panofsky and Saxl] of the 1514 
engraving as a self-portrait is illuminating, for it is consistent with a notion of melancholy as the 
dangerous foregrounding of self. Dürer’s pensive angel, assuming a posture of inwardness that she 
shares with the artist in the Self-Portrait in Erlangen, provides the occasion wherein, exemplarily, the 
historiography of art can link the visual image to the person of the artist,’ p. 27. See also Benjamin 
2015, pp. 55-94.
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putative analysts and epidemiologists render themselves susceptible to 
melancholia’s multifarious blandishments in their very approach.
If Romeo and Juliet famously begins with its eponymous male 
protagonist suffering a flagrant and parodic bout of melancholia – to the 
extent that he becomes the butt of diegetic humour from characters such 
as Mercutio – it is undoubtedly Hamlet who provides one of the greatest 
early modern figures of (perhaps simulated) melancholy. As Hamlet 
complains to his mother: 
‘Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not “seems.”
’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forc’d breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected ‘haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief,
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem,
For they are actions that a man might play;
But I have that within which passes show,
These but the trappings and the suits of woe.’3
While putting on a show that both truly expresses and truly 
dissimulates the metamorphic disorder beneath, the Prince of Denmark 
maniacally asserts the withdrawal of the real of melancholia beyond any 
possible figure of action in the world. Yet we all know what happens when 
the madman’s mask of melancholia finally falls: the escalating execution 
of foes, friends, and family, up to the fall of the state itself. 
Such a violent and paradoxical assertion of the inassertability of the 
inwardness conjured by the melancholic sufferer returns, moreover, in its 
multiple avatars. 
It is surely the abiding paradoxes of such a condition that have 
led to melancholia’s astonishing efflorescence today as a crucial 
category for much self-consciously critical philosophy. Let us give a few 
significant indications. As Julia Kristeva puts it in her own famous study 
of the condition: ‘there is no imagination that is not, overtly or secretly, 
melancholy.’4 Slavoj Žižek, while denouncing the garden-variety cultural 
studies valorisation of ‘melancholia’ over ‘mourning,’ can still end up 
affirming that ‘melancholy (disappointment at all positive, observable 
objects, none of which can satisfy our desire) effectively is the beginning 
of philosophy.’5 Judith Butler proposes ‘gender as a kind of melancholy, 
3  Shakespeare, 1.2.76-86.
4  Kristeva 1989, p. 6.
5  Žižek 2000, p. 660. See also Žižek 2001, esp. pp. 141-148.
or as one of melancholy’s effects.’6 Ranjana Khanna notes that ‘one of 
the reasons psychoanalytically conceived melancholia is a compelling 
rubric for an analysis of postcoloniality is that it is anti-identitarian while 
compelled by a situation and is affective without sentimentality. It is also 
highly self-critical.’7 The reader will immediately note that all of these 
accounts, whatever their differences, suggest that melancholia, in its 
apparent detachment from all existing objects through its unreasonable 
refusal to mourn the lost, thereby offers precisely a radical chance not 
only for personal, but also for political renewal.
Under such descriptions, politics and melancholia would find their 
attenuated and antagonistic articulation regarding the point of the sense 
of the world: politics being a communal practice that strives to effect 
another sense of the world or even create another world, characterized by 
affects of enthusiasm; melancholia would be a form of individual inaction 
correlated with a suspension of any sense of world, and characterized 
by singular affects of anhedonia and despair. Yet at the same time, 
melancholia becomes at once an essential goad and a threat to political 
activism, as well as a reminder to politics of the perils of totalisation, 
that actualization can undermine its own raisons d’être, and that the 
claims of temporality cannot simply be effaced by the passing of the past. 
Both politics and melancholia would therefore also engage – if through 
irreducible operations – a kind of torsion of depersonalization, politics 
exceeding the will from above, as it were, and melancholia evacuating the 
will from below. 
Yet can this contemporary critical concordance regarding the 
paradoxical import of melancholia for politics be persuasively sustained? 
After all, we are experiencing something perhaps unheralded in previous 
forms of political governance and medical diagnosis. Politics proper 
seems to have become the object of a deracinated, privatized corporate 
technocracy, for which communal action does not designate a project or 
program founded on a struggle over social divisions and distributions, 
but only for ‘sustainable’ ‘profitability’ under conditions of ‘global’ 
‘competitiveness,’ which simultaneously requires an extraordinary 
security and surveillance apparatus. To give some key indicators of the 
former, it will hopefully suffice here to list a variety of recent geopolitical 
events: the causation of the financial sector with regards to the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008, and its ongoing effects; the replacement of 
elected governments in Italy and Greece with interim placeholders; 
the recent signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the 
ongoing discussions regarding the Transantlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). Examples could easily be multiplied.
6  Butler 1997, p. 132.
7  Khanna 2013, p. 257.
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Despite, then, the intermediate and brief period of ‘Third Way’ 
handling of the opposition between left and right, the latter has now 
dissolved into an anti-politics that qualifies itself as the management 
of societal problems and public debts. Much of contemporary politics 
presents itself as post-ideological and therefore as realistic, and, 
as far as clearly identifiable problems are concerned, pragmatic. A 
remarkable feature of this realistic view consists in the Cartesian doubt 
as to whether society actually exists or should rather be treated as 
an idealistic, unreal abstraction. The British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, one of the great nominalist prophets of the new order, was 
herself in no doubt as to the real of the situation. As she notoriously 
asserted in an interview with – of all media – Women’s Own magazine: 
‘there’s no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and 
there are families.’ Society does not exist, in fact, it is only a flatus vocis; 
the only real and effective existents are individuals. To the extent that 
these individuals are more than productive units, they can function as 
reproductive units, that is, ‘families.’
This form of radical doubt brackets the traditional realm of politics, 
i.e. society, only to find the indubitable reality of the individual. As this 
individual reality can only be discerned through this self-destructive 
move of politics, the latter should not bother the former. In this respect, 
politics and the individual should peacefully co-exist, as two domains 
whose intersection should be kept as minimal as possible. Politics should 
guarantee the freedom of the individual, which is first and foremost the 
freedom to experience one’s individual life as devoid of any political 
dimension. 
For the North American context, Adam Curtis’ documentary The 
Century of the Self (2002) has convincingly depicted the evolution of how 
a large group of socially aware and politically active citizens turned into 
self-expressive individuals mainly preoccupied with creating (mental) 
spaces onto which society or the state can have no grasp.8 This change 
in attitude did not lead to the demand for a different politics but rather 
simply less of it. Change should not pass through or be realized by the 
political domain, but effected by the individual, starting with himself: 
if you want to change the world, change yourself. Today we witness 
the effects of these concomitant tendencies towards depoliticization, 
individualization and personal responsabilization, and one of the main 
ones is depression and related mood disorders.9
So at the same time as political economy is transformed into a 
8  For a similar argument, which also takes into account the French context of the depression 
epidemic, see Ehrenberg 2010.
9  According to the World Health Organization, depression is the leading cause of disability 
worldwide, currently affecting not less than 350 million people: see http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs369/.
real-time global techno-economy, melancholia is replaced by allegedly 
neurological diagnoses of ‘depression,’ and its treatment almost entirely 
exhausted by psychopharmacology. It remains extremely doubtful 
whether this renomination itself constitutes any kind of advance, or 
should rather be considered a disavowed asylum ignorantiae, a name that 
essays to supplant paradox by vacuity. As David Healy remarks in one of 
his groundbreaking studies: 
There has been astonishing progress in the neurosciences but little 
or no progress in understanding depression. The fact that the SSRIs 
are no more effective than other antidepressants questions the idea 
that depression is the kind of target that a specific magic bullet will 
someday hit dead centre. The fact that both specific norepinephrine 
reuptake inhibitors and specific 5HT reuptake inhibitors may 
cure it points strongly to the fact that it is simply not a single 
neurotransmitter disorder.10 
This collection, however, is not on depression as an effect or 
symptom of depoliticization, but on melancholia.11 Melancholia may 
belong to the same semantic field as depression or, qua pathology, 
even be identical to it – Freud’s description in his seminal 1917 essay 
on melancholia neither includes nor excludes features absent from 
contemporary depression – yet the former notion has a longer and 
more varied history than the latter. As Jennifer Radden remarks: 
‘Clinical depression as it is understood today bears similarities to the 
melancholy and melancholic states of earlier times. But the addition of 
this later writing on clinical depression must not be taken to suggest 
any unproblematic continuity between these two bodies of writing, 
nor an unproblematic identity between these two similar but perhaps 
not equivalent conditions.’12 The very use of the word ‘melancholia’ is 
therefore meant to take a critical distance from the connotations of the 
category of depression, which is a term borrowed from the economic field 
and allegedly first used in a technical sense by the Swiss psychiatrist 
Adolf Meyer in the early twentieth century.13 Depression is not only a 
mental disease symptomatic of our times, but also an adequate reflection 
of them: the individual suffering with himself and with a loss of world, 
10  D. Healy, The Anti-Depressant Era (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 
1997), p. 174.
11  For a short but illuminating essay on the connection between depoliticization and depres-
sion see Mark Fisher 2009.
12  Radden 2000, p. xi. See also Radden 2003.
13  See Styron 1992. This ‘memoir of his nervous illness,’ titled after a line in John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost by the author of Sophie’s Choice, is of interest in the current context for a number of 
reasons.
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treated by medical experts as a decontextualized mood disorder, that 
is the mere negative of the happy, successful hedonist or, indeed, of the 
normalizing figure of the ‘resilient individual’ that now proliferates across 
all sectors of life.
In contrast to this, melancholia does not solely put the emphasis 
on what is dysfunctional or debilitating about depressive feelings 
such as lack of self-esteem, loss of interest, etc., but leaves room to 
explore, perhaps even establish, a more complex relation to the social 
and political conditions within which it arises. Depression appears as a 
vicious circle in which fundamental features of the disease, such as loss 
of valuable social relations and engagements, are considered the desired 
result of its treatment, to be the healthy yet asocial individual. In contrast, 
melancholia can be considered as a contemplative distance, a break with 
the present precisely needed to engage with the conditions within which 
it occurs.
Yet to say this is also to point to a new twist in the ancient 
quarrel between politics and melancholia. If we began by indicating 
a fundamental non-relation between the two, before offering a brief 
summary of some of their characteristic features that might complicate 
this non-relation without undue reduction, we have also (very sketchily) 
delineated a new situation – our own – which is characterized by a kind 
of double dissolution. On the one hand, we are attesting to a global 
de-politicization; on the other, to a global de-melancholization. The 
former bespeaks a new dominance of technical financial management; 
the latter denotes a new dominance of the acephalic character of the 
depressed person. We are therefore suggesting that this emergent 
dispensation of corporate management and privatized depression only 
sustains the ancient antagonism between politics and melancholia at 
the cost of the loss of the significance of both. In other words, the near-
total vitiation of the relative autonomy of variant localities by a kind of 
financial and technical deterritorialization – that is simultaneously also 
a reterritorialization according to new abstract economic operations – 
entails both a general decrease in politics and a decrease in melancholia.
Yet it is also precisely this possible supersession of the complex 
non-relation between politics and melancholia that perhaps unexpectedly 
reopens the question of this non-relation today. In this respect, we 
repeat the Freudian distinction between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mourning 
here as the difference between depression and melancholia. If Freud 
considered melancholia as a failed mourning – because its triggering loss 
is unconscious which makes the required work of mourning impossible – 
our suggestion is to consider melancholia as an antidote to the current 
understanding of depression as a mere dysfunctionality to be treated by 
antidepressants. In doing so, we are expressly interested in the world-
destroying and world-creating potentials of melancholia – indeed, in a 
sense, following ‘the loss of the world itself’ that the current situation 
perhaps presents us with.14
This, however, should not inevitably lead to the conclusion that 
melancholia is, as Byron put it, “the telescope of truth.” When taking 
into account the texts contributed to this issue, one can only notice the 
different interpretations given to melancholia, in some cases based on 
detailed attempts at turning it into a clearly delineated notion. Moreover, 
besides the different approaches, one can discern different appreciations, 
positive and negative, from sentimentality and fethishistic disavowal to, 
indeed, melancholia as that equally fearful and much needed gift.
The first text included in this collection deals with an almost 
emblematic author when it comes to study melancholia and politics: 
Walter Benjamin. In his short but often cited ninth thesis on the concept 
of history Benjamin, inspired by Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus, 
evokes ‘the angel of history.’ Sami Khatib – critical of fashionable 
readings that either emphasize the melancholic messianistic hope evoked 
by this angelic image or consider it as an expression of Benjamin’s 
melancholic disposition – presents a close reading fuelled by Freud, 
Lacan and Agamben. If one can read Benjamin through a melancholic 
lens, the importance of his work does reside in neither an apology for 
a fixation on a lost object, nor the ‘perverse’ hope in a messianic end 
to history. Taking up the Lacanian distinction between vision and the 
gaze, Khatib argues that what the angel sees cannot coincide with what 
causes his desire to see. A mere melancholic reading ends up confusing 
(empirical) loss with (structural) lack, and hence as an implicit argument 
to passively await an impending final catastrophe undoing lack (and loss 
for that matter). Khatib exposes a different reading, without altogether 
dismissing melancholy as myopic. Precisely because melancholy is 
concerned with lack and temporality, it may open up onto a politics that 
is based on the insight that history is incomplete and demands political 
action.15
From Khatib’s analysis of Benjamin, Rebecca Comay returns us 
to a moment that she exposes as crucial to philosophical modernity: the 
hypochondria of Immanuel Kant. There are few things in life, Freud once 
noted, as costly as sickness and stupidity. There are also few things 
at once more intimate and elusive than sickness. As Comay puts it, 
the suffering of illness ‘forces a sociability that it simultaneously pre-
empts,’ putting into question the terms under which it might receive 
ethical or political acknowledgement. The problems such suffering in 
principle poses to any potential conceptual epidemiology are racheted-
up to unprecedented extremity by the phenomenon of hypochondria. At 
once patent yet unverifiable, beyond truth and illusion, hypochondria 
14  Recalling Marguerite Duras’s notorious statement “que le monde aille à sa perte, c’est la 
seule politique.” See Duras 1977, p. 25 and 1990, p. 30.
15  Which echoes the conclusion of Mladek and Edmondson’s article on left melancholy (2009).
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nonetheless comes time-stamped with and as Enlightenment, one of 
the great European biomedical products of the eighteenth century. 
Yet hypochondria is also surprisingly funny: as the ancient humoral 
theories of melancholia give way to new neurological explanations, the 
hypochondriac becomes a privileged butt of humour. Who, given this 
situation, could be a more appropriate figure of the hypochondriacal 
antinomies than Immanuel Kant himself? In the third of the essays that 
comprise the Conflict of the Faculties – part of Kant’s famous ‘senilia’ – the 
philosopher expressly confronts medicine with philosophy. Yet to consider 
the body at once proposes mereological, spatial, temporal, aspectual, 
modal, and aetiological aporias to philosophy. Indeed, in its delocalized 
corrosion of the vital distinction between quality and quality, the 
operations of hypochondria not only rapidly start to resemble the strange 
homelessness of philosophy itself, but threaten to drown the inquirer 
‘in an ocean of liar’s paradoxes.’ For Comay, what is ‘so unnerving for 
the hypochondriac is not so much the obtuseness of the body but rather 
its uncanny intelligence.’ In following this line, Comay essays to evade 
those so-familiar critiques of the dialectic of Enlightenment – which see 
reason’s attempts to curb the brutality of the body inexorably result in 
ever-more dramatic scenes of brutality – in order to return to Kantian 
hypochondria the paradox of the stupefying resilience of the indecently-
aged, which ‘testifies to an insistent, unapologetic undeadness at the 
heart of life itself.’
Such an undeadness at the heart of life continues to offer a rebuke 
to the institutions that seek to foreclose it. Friedrich Nietzsche once 
invoked the ancient injunction to ‘mate with the dead’; melancholia 
instead proposes that we ‘mate with the undead.’ In his contribution 
Marc De Kesel argues that modern politics is inevitably melancholic, 
for it devotes itself to a cause that has no base in being. The break of 
modernity consists in a break from onto-theology which, on a political 
plane, leads to the insight that the realm of politics is based on neither 
a divine order nor a natural plan, but on human will. Through a detailed 
discussion of Fénelon’s advice to Philip V and Pascal’s Discourse on the 
Condition of the Great, De Kesel shows how both authors were aware of 
the contingency of royal power – the king possesses power without having 
it –, yet came to diverging conclusions. Despite this difference, De Kesel 
shows how melancholy is structurally part of the reflection on politics, 
from the 17th century up to Slavoj Žižek: the cause is not to be considered 
as what can get accidentally lost – and therefore mourned – but as lacking 
any substantial being. In this respect the modern political subject can 
only be melancholic, having lost what it never had.
In his text, Karel Vanhaesebrouck takes inspiration from the same 
historical period, the baroque, in order to sketch a dark yet vivid painting 
of a world not only dominated by, but ultimately reducible to mere 
representations. The play and spectacular display of images provokes 
the quest for an ultimate reality, which is discovered as the human 
body. This body is vulnerable and mortal, and the pleasures it produces 
hardly suffice to veil a fundamental dissatisfaction. For the baroque 
libertine, e.g., the great English poet John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, 
sexual enjoyment in particular provides the ambivalent trace of a missing 
enjoyment. This godforsaken universe – lacking order or the promise of 
a better world jenseits – needs theatre, not only as divertissement, not 
only to stage illusory worlds, but also as a means to bring to the fore 
the illusion of any illusion. Here Vanhaesebrouck argues that we are not 
beyond or past this set of interrelated problems and – via a discussion of 
contemporary artists such as Ken Russell, Anish Kapoor and the work of 
the Belgian theatre company Abattoir Fermé – that baroque is the new 
black.
Although Lieven De Cauter starts his discussion of the topic 
with a quote from another seventeenth century source. the opening 
lines of Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, the issue at stake is 
different. Inspired by Walter Benjamin, De Cauter sketches the cultural 
vicissitudes of melancholy and pays attention to the severing of the bond 
between the two poles of depression and mania, of decay and geniality. 
In Romanticism, melancholy consists mainly in a feeling of loss and 
nostalgia may be the more appropriate term. This nostalgia, however, 
should not only be understood as a reactionary tendency to return to an 
earlier state, as it can also take on an utopian dimension and be as such 
directed to the future. Nonetheless, the critique of modernity seems to 
prefer the depressive side of melancholy to the detriment of its ‘manic’ 
or active aspect. Against this background the author understands our 
current post-historical melancholy as a result of the end of history-
as-progress. This melancholy is not the sadness of an idle, somehow 
‘unprogressive’ Sunday afternoon, but the effect of the experience that 
progress turns against itself because of ecological limitations. Not one, 
but a combination of catastrophes are awaiting us or are already taking 
place. In conclusion De Cauter explores this predominant mood and 
discerns a space for possible (counter-)action.
Also taking up the challenge of contemporary action, Klaas 
Tindemans discusses the link between politics and melancholia by means 
of a series of concrete cases. Precisely because moderns considered 
melancholy as an obstacle to a progress-oriented project, melancholy 
became the antipole of political activity. Yet, starting from Théroigne 
de Méricourt and ending with Wilfried Martens (the late Belgian prime 
minister and former president of the European People’s Party), Tindemans 
explores the different ways in which the noonday demon inserted itself 
in political life. Théroigne de Méricourt is an exemplary case for the 
pathologization of revolutionary fervour, whilst Abraham Lincoln testifies 
to a melancholy that does not exclude the execution of political power. 
This tension, however, gets resolved as soon as politics neither excludes 
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nor includes personal melancholy, but turns melancholic itself – examples 
here are Pierre Bérégovoy and Gordon Brown. The culminating or at least 
most recent point in this history consists in a loss of both melancholy 
and politics: whereas the melancholic does not know what but still knows 
that something has been lost, contemporary politicians are unable to 
acknowledge any loss at all. This has hardly anything to do their personal 
particularities, but with, as Tindemans argues, a general crisis which 
consists in the inability of connecting the present with a past and a future 
on a political plane.
Perhaps unexpectedly, it is precisely with respect to such a crisis 
situation of ‘presentist’ disconnection that Jon Roffe examines what 
Gilles Deleuze has to offer to the thought of the relation between 
melancholia and politics today. Deleuze has a well-known animus 
against psychoanalysis: psychosis over neurosis is the formula. Whereas 
neurotics are whiny and go to psychoanalysis because they want to be 
loved, the psychotic out for a walk extracts and binds the heterogeneity 
of the world according to a process of impersonal desire. Melancholia, 
hence, would unsurprisingly be absent from the list of Deleuze’s 
desiderata as a paradigmatic concept of object-loss and time-capture. 
Yet there is indeed a concept of melancholia to be reconstructed from 
Deleuze’s work in the wake of Lacan, especially given the peculiar 
interstitial nature of melancholy, which seems to partake of neurotic, 
psychotic and perverse elements simultaneously and irreducibly. In 
Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze takes up Lacan in considering 
the object a virtual ‘shred of the pure past.’ In doing so, he reconfigures 
this virtuality not only as a constitutive subjective element, but more 
significantly as an objective problematic, at once undetermined and 
insistent. By Anti-Oedipus, co-written with Felix Guattari, Deleuze’s 
anti-psychoanalytic position may seem to have hardened into a mode 
of extreme rejection. Yet this is not the case, as Roffe argues. Rather, 
if a critique, it is also an extension of a trajectory from Freud through 
Klein and Lacan. By their direct investment of the social field by desire, 
Deleuze and Guattari at once show how traditional psychoanalysis is 
necessarily limited to conceiving Oedipus as a crisis and a structure 
– and nothing more besides – and that desire needs to be thought as a 
delirium which lacks nothing. So: whence melancholia? Although neither 
of Deleuze’s Cinema books mention melancholia by name, they construct 
a schema from which a functionally-comparable and compatible 
concept can emerge. For Deleuze, cinema is marked by four features: 
its inhuman production, its sensory-motor-system (SMS) reception, its 
disruptiveness, and its creativity. In short, cinema becomes a mass-
producer of problematic objects which serve to disrupt existing SMS 
filters in order that we can literally plug ourselves back into a kind of 
belief in the world. On this basis, Roffe even argues that the apparent 
neglect, critique or absence of melancholia from Deleuze is not a sign of 
its irrelevance or noxiousness, but, on the contrary, of its unprecedented 
generalization. The new world heralded by Deleuze is, in the end, nothing 
but this world itself, the world of schizoid connections.
If the melancholic temperament has since antiquity often been 
considered related to the imagination of the creator of works of art, the 
same courtesy diagnosis has not usually been extended to the translators 
of such works. Perhaps the reasons are obvious: the translator is not a 
creator, but a kind of degraded duplicator; to the extent that his or her 
imagination is at stake at all, it is in a strictly derivative role; as a piece 
of writing, the translation itself finds itself in the situation of having to 
be supplemented by explanatory notes. Yet in another sense, the relation 
between melancholia and translation couldn’t be more marked: every 
translation is by definition indexed to a prior original, which it defectively 
repeats, but would be literally nothing without. We could go further, along 
lines suggested by Walter Benjamin: every translation gestures towards 
the lost Adamic tongue, and thus, in its own necessarily weakened 
fashion, towards the messianic reconciliation of all languages, the Reine 
Sprache of a suprahistorical kinship. Here Sigi Jöttkandt takes up the 
divided works of Vladimir Nabokov, who was writing Pale Fire at the same 
time as he was translating Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin. The first-named 
work was highly celebrated; the indifferent reception of the second was 
in fact a cause of a very public falling-out between Nabokov and Edmund 
White. Yet Nabokov’s two works are densely imbricated, expressly staging 
the intense convolutions of energetic melancholic operations. Jöttkandt 
notes Nabokov’s characteristic work of doubling, at the levels of style, 
allusion, and theme, which emit seductive clouds of black bile. Nabokov 
shuttles between creation and translation, even as the creation is itself 
divided by its intertextual references to Shakespeare and Middleton’s 
problem play Timon of Athens, and as the translation turns about a 
ciphered recreation of Nabokov’s own pre-Revolutionary aristocratic 
memories. Jöttkandt, citing Carol Jacobs, speaks of the melancholic 
‘teratogenesis’ of such reproductions – a teratogenesis in which the 
singularity of the lost object is dissimulated in the outrageous patency of 
Nabokovian style.
If it is often acknowledged that art undoes the laws upon which 
it relies, what of the law per se? So Peter Goodrich asks: Is the law 
itself of an atrabilious temperament? Can it cause or curb or even cure 
the disease of which it is itself one of the most aggressive symptoms? 
An imbalance of the black bile of ancient European medicine may well 
enervate or paralyze, but it might just as well inspire a singular diagram 
of homeopathy to be delivered by the law. The period now often referred 
to, for variously historical and anti-historical reasons, as Early Modern 
Europe (that is, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries) is witness to 
a particularly intense experience of sovereign melancholy in its art and 
philosophy – as in its law-making and law-breaking. As Goodrich notes, 
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‘the figure of the melancholic is that of an escaping lawyer.’ The situation 
is perhaps at its most evident extremity in England, where the Common 
Law is acknowledged to lack precisely what it needs: a Digest, whether 
of a Justinian or a Gratian. Lacking a digest, the law has literally become 
indigestible. The common lawyers who gorge on their four cases daily 
are emblematic gluttons of singularities. The more they consume, the 
more ravenous they become, as their very diet refuses the bitter pill of 
a properly satiating commonality. So this law-that-lacks-law, that is, its 
own unity and universality despite its nominal commonness, provokes 
what Goodrich aptly names corpus envy. If the sovereign lacks, he thereby 
calls for a fellow or fallow phallic nomothete to reinstitute or restitute 
the law. But what comes instead of our desired-for institutor of law are 
merely further collectors, whose attempts at collection only prove further 
recollections – recollections of what-never-was. Such recollection, 
moreover, only repeats the dispersion: the white light of law cannot 
be found in any of its black letters. An enigma returns at the source 
from which the collectors ever further descend. The law may well be an 
ass – but it is also an arse, insofar as it can only rest, must rest, upon its 
gaping fundamentals. Like Dante the Pilgrim, the English lawyers must 
seek egress if not redress from the inferno at the end of the colon. But 
there’s no getting to the bottom of it. The foul smells that attend such 
ancient profundity are the last will and testament of the law’s indigestible 
indigestion. Saturn the pedophage or infantester becomes the very 
emblem of the inexorable rot of time at the core of the law.
A father-castrating child-eater may not immediately present 
himself as a formula for true happiness, but the classical world was in no 
doubt: Saturn’s was a golden age. As Hesiod sings in Works and Days:
First of all the immortals who dwell in Olympian homes
brought into being the golden race of mortal men.
These belonged to the time when Kronos ruled over heaven,
and they lived like gods without any care in their hearts,
free and apart from labour and misery.16
So, with our final essay by Alexi Kukuljevic, the circuitousness of 
melancholia receives perhaps the unkindest cut of all: happiness. As 
‘the affective registration of the dereliction of things,’ melancholia has 
also always been held to have some privileged relation to the revelation 
of the truth of existence. In its ambit, objects are separated from things, 
subjects become objects, being is infested by phantasms, and the 
natural sweetness of life becomes unbearable misery. Taking up Giorgio 
16  Hesiod 1983, p. 101. Ovid is obviously another source, e.g., ‘Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae 
vindice nullo,/sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat’ (Golden was that first age, which, with no 
one to compel, without a law, of its own will, kept faith and did the right) Ovid 2004, pp. 8/9.
Agamben’s analyses in Stanzas, Kukuljevic shows how the appropriation 
of originary negativity by melancholia is operative in Charles Baudelaire’s 
poetry of spleen. The bilious and intoxicating fumes of spleen corrode the 
subject and its place, swirling into the bronchial crevices of its Romantic 
lungs, until the melancholic literally coughs him- or herself up as a 
graveyard where the long worms feed. As Kukuljevic concludes: ‘If the 
happiness of the melancholic lies in its phantasmatic identification with 
its own extinction, this is because at this hyperbolic extreme that which 
is most heavy becomes bearably light and the void that crushes becomes 
the void whose phantasmatic seizure marks this thinking animal’s 
commitment to a culture that praises something other than stupefaction.’ 
History as a graveyard of enthusiasms or as the triumph of perfected 
iniquity may roil the beautiful soul, but induces the melancholic to a 
protracted and painful disentangling of the bonds between life and joy.
If melancholia, which contemplates the end of time itself from 
within the passing of time and gathers up in order to strew around its 
own living death its disparate inheritances which have lost all reason but 
their facticity, still inhabits the conceptual closures of reflexivity, critique, 
and activity which today remain in force without sense, this is because 
it constitutes a signature of a bond between thinking and undeath. As a 
vector of life, melancholia marks the paradox of the undead; as a vector 
of truth, melancholia refuses not to attend to the impasses in and of the 
real; as a vector of action, melancholia ratchets-up the incapacity of 
action to a violent lassitude. This current collection offers a variety of 
means by which to articulate melancholia’s claims with those of politics.
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